The role of narrativity in Ronald Dworkin’s legal theory: is there a narrative theory in “How law is like literature”?
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.21119/anamps.52.441-463Keywords:
Dworkin, narrative, law, literature, hermeneutics.Abstract
This paper has the purpose of assessing the role of narrativity in Ronald Dworkin’s theory of law. The research question is to know whether Dworkin’s theory of law can be considered a narrative theory of law. By narrative theory, we mean a theory that is based on a heuristic characterization of plots, narrative genres, characters etc. Dworkin introduces six theses in order to link literature and law, in his classic “How law is like literature”: (1) law, as a practice of identifying valid legal propositions, can be better understood when compared to the practice of literature (synechist methodology thesis); (2) the compression of the practice of law always involves a descriptive and valuative dimension (normative theory thesis); (3) every judgment about art presupposes a theory about what art is (aesthetical hypothesis); (4) every judgment about valid legal propositions presupposes the determination of what law is (political hypothesis); (5) the political hypothesis of law depends on understanding the intentionality of the political community (chain novel); and (6) The chain novel depends on understanding the institutional history of the political community (institutional history thesis). This paper’s conclusion is that Dworkin’s theory must be seen as a narrative theory, and that without such narrative aspect, his theory would simply be a legal naturalistic theory, since the purpose or value of the law would thus become absolute.
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